Dogs learn to solve the support problem based on perceptual cues by unknown
ORIGINAL PAPER
Dogs learn to solve the support problem based on perceptual cues
Corsin A. Mu¨ller • Stefanie Riemer •
Zso´fia Vira´nyi • Ludwig Huber • Friederike Range
Received: 4 December 2013 / Revised: 16 February 2014 / Accepted: 19 February 2014 / Published online: 4 March 2014
 The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Numerous recent studies have investigated how
animals solve means-end tasks and unraveled considerable
variation in strategies used by different species. Domestic
dogs (Canis familiaris) have typically performed compa-
rably poorly in physical cognition tasks, but a recent study
showed that they can solve the on–off condition of the
support problem, where they are confronted with two
boards, one with a reward placed on it and the other with a
reward placed next to it. To explore which strategies dogs
use to solve this task, we first tested 37 dogs with the on–
off condition tested previously and then tested subjects that
passed this condition with three transfer tasks. For the
contact condition, the inaccessible reward was touching the
second board. For the perceptual containment condition,
the inaccessible reward was surrounded on three sides by
the second board, but not supported by it, whereas for the
gap condition, discontinuous boards were used. Unlike in
the previous study, our subjects did not perform above
chance level in the initial trials of the on–off condition, but
13 subjects learned to solve it. Their performance in the
transfer tasks suggests that dogs can learn to solve the
support problem based on perceptual cues, that they can
quickly adopt new cues when old ones become unreliable,
but also that some apparently inherent preferences are hard
to overcome. Our study contributes to accumulating evi-
dence demonstrating that animals typically rely on a vari-
ety of perceptual cues to solve physical cognition tasks,
without developing an understanding of the underlying
causal structure.
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Introduction
Most humans can spontaneously solve means-end tasks by
assessing the causal structure of the problem, without the
need to resort to trial-and-error learning. This ability is
based on ‘‘folk physics’’, an understanding of the physical
world that develops naturally in human infants and is built
on observation of and experimentation with regularities in
the physical world, which extend and/or confirm innate
predispositions or core beliefs (Baillargeon 1994; Povinelli
2000; Spelke 2000; Baillargeon 2002; Carey 2009; Johnson
2010). In the last decades, considerable effort has been
invested to investigate how animals solve such tasks. While
claims of evidence for insightful problem solving in ani-
mals have typically not withstood scrutiny (c.f. Kacelnik
2009; Taylor and Gray 2009; Taylor et al. 2012), a large
body of evidence has accumulated suggesting considerable
variation between species in how they solve physical
problems. A series of not mutually exclusive strategies
have been suggested, which differ mainly in the extent to
which they do (or do not) involve causal information in
addition to reliance on learned perceptual cues. Among
others, these include the development of an intuitive
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understanding through experience (Auersperg et al. 2009),
a causality bias during associative learning (Hanus and Call
2011), reliance on perceptual correlates of the causal
mechanism (Povinelli 2000) or heuristic strategies (Hunt
et al. 2006), but also reliance on perceptual feedback (e.g.,
Taylor et al. 2012; Riemer et al. 2013) or simple trial-and-
error learning with subsequent generalization (e.g., De
Mendonc¸a-Furtado and Ottoni 2008; Mu¨ller 2010).
Piaget’s support problem (Piaget 1952) has been used in
a variety of species to test for their understanding of
means-end connections (e.g., great apes: Povinelli et al.
2000; Herrmann et al. 2008; monkeys: Hauser et al. 1999;
Yocom and Boysen 2010; Yamazaki et al. 2011; elephants:
Irie-Sugimoto et al. 2008; and kea: Auersperg et al. 2009).
It involves a target object (usually a piece of food) that is
placed out of reach of the subject on a support (e.g., a piece
of cloth or a wooden board) that is within the subject’s
reach. In the classic setup, the subjects are presented with
two choices: a support that carries a piece of reward, and a
second support beside which another piece of reward has
been placed. Subjects may solve this task spontaneously
(e.g., Povinelli et al. 2000; Herrmann et al. 2008; Auer-
sperg et al. 2009; Yamazaki et al. 2011) or learn to solve it
after a number of sessions (e.g., Hauser et al. 1999; Irie-
Sugimoto et al. 2008; Yocom and Boysen 2010). In either
case, however, it remains unclear whether the subjects
understood the causal structure of the task, or whether they
solved the task based on perceptual cues such as contact
between reward and support or perceptual containment of
the reward within the support.
To determine whether subjects relied on perceptual cues
to solve the classic support problem, and if so, which ones
they used, it is necessary that successful subjects are sub-
sequently presented with modified versions of the classic
setup (transfer tasks) where causally relevant aspects of the
setup have been changed. When employed previously,
performance in such transfer tasks typically indicated that
animals relied on a variety of perceptual cues to solve the
classic support problem and consequently failed at least
initially in one or several of the transfer tasks (Povinelli
et al. 2000; Irie-Sugimoto et al. 2008; Auersperg et al.
2009; Yamazaki et al. 2011). For example, the chimpan-
zees tested by Povinelli et al. (2000, p. 268f) failed in
transfer tasks where the reward was surrounded, but not
supported by the cloth and thus may have relied on ‘‘cur-
rent or imminent contact’’ for their choices, though this
finding was not replicated in a later study with enculturated
chimpanzees (Yocom and Boysen 2011). Also, the mar-
mosets tested by Yamazaki et al. (2011) relied on several
perceptual cues, including size of the reward, distance to
the reward and distance between the support and the ‘‘off’’
reward. Similarly, the majority of the rooks that solved a
different physical cognition task, the trap-tube task, did so
by avoiding a perceptual cue, that is by pushing the reward
away from the trap protruding from the tube (Tebbich et al.
2007) or from the black disk at the bottom of the functional
trap (Seed et al. 2006).
Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) have typically per-
formed poorly in physical cognition tasks compared to
other mammals (e.g., Collier-Baker et al. 2004; Osthaus
et al. 2005; Bra¨uer et al. 2006; Fiset and Leblanc 2007).
For example, in a two-choice task, dogs preferentially
chose the container from which a noise had emanated both
when the container was shaken and the piece of food in the
container caused the noise, and when a cellular phone rang
inside the container (a non-causal, arbitrary cue) (Bra¨uer
et al. 2006). Also, dogs typically made their choice based
on proximity rather than connectivity in string-pulling
tasks (Osthaus et al. 2005; but see Riemer et al. 2013 for
some exceptions). In contrast, a recent study (Range et al.
2011) suggested that dogs can perform well when pre-
sented with the support problem, where misleading prox-
imity cues are less prominent than, for example, in the
classic string-pulling tasks tested by Osthaus et al. (2005).
In the study of Range et al. (2011), the dogs performed
above chance level in four conditions where an out-of-
reach food reward was placed on a board and a second
reward was placed in different positions beside or behind a
second board, so that the accessible reward was either
closer, at equal distance or further away from the dog than
the inaccessible reward.
The study of Range et al. (2011) suggests that dogs can
solve the support problem, but it did not test which strat-
egies they use to solve it. In particular, it remains unclear
whether they solved the task based on perceptual cues, and
if so, which cues they relied on. Here, we extend the study
of Range et al. (2011) to determine which information dogs
use to solve the support problem. After a replication of the
classic on–off condition (condition 1 in Range et al. 2011;
cf. Fig. 2), we tested successful dogs with three transfer
tasks, the conditions contact, perceptual containment and
gap (Fig. 2). With these, we tested whether the dogs that
had solved the on–off condition had relied on particular
visual cues when making their decision which option to
choose to gain access to the out-of-reach reward.
Visual cues that could potentially be used when learning
to solve the on–off condition include the color or brightness
of the background on which the reward is resting, alignment
of the reward and the board, contact between the reward and
the board, perceptual containment of the reward within the
board, continuity of the board and the reward, and the ver-
tical level of the reward. Different predictions for the per-
formance in the three transfer conditions, relative to the
performance in the on–off condition, are made depending on
which of these cues had been used to solve the on–off con-
dition (summarized in Table 1). If the subjects learned to
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choose the side where the reward was resting on a bright
yellow background (the color of the boards used in this
study), rather than on a black background, we would expect
their performance to remain on the same, high level in the
perceptual containment condition, where this cue is still
reliable. However, we would expect the performance to drop
in the contact condition, where this cue is less obvious, and
to drop to chance level in the gap condition, where the
background cue is not informative. If the subjects learned to
choose the reward that was aligned with the board, rather
than the one that was misaligned, we would predict that
performance drops to chance level in the perceptual con-
tainment condition and the gap condition, where alignment
does not differ between the two options. Moreover, in this
case performance should also be lower in the contact con-
dition than in the on–off condition, since the alignment cue is
less clear in the former than in the latter. If the subjects
learned to choose the board that was in visual contact with
the reward, we would predict that the performance drops to
chance level in the contact condition and in the gap condi-
tion, where both rewards are in contact with one of the
boards, but that it is not significantly reduced in the per-
ceptual containment condition where, like in the on–off
condition, the inaccessible reward does not touch the yellow
board. If the subjects learned to choose the side of the reward
that was visually surrounded by one of the boards (or per-
ceptually contained within its optical field, cf. Povinelli et al.
2000; Auersperg et al. 2009), we would predict that per-
formance would drop to chance level in the gap condition,
where visual containment is equal for both options, and to
drop also in the contact and perceptual containment condi-
tions, since the difference in visual containment between the
two options is reduced in both of them compared with the
on–off condition. If the subjects learned to choose the board
that provided an uninterrupted connection to one of the
rewards, we would predict that the performance drops to
chance level in the contact condition, where this is the case
for both of the presented options. In contrast, we would
predict that performance remains on a high level for the gap
condition and that performance is reduced in the perceptual
containment condition, where the gap between the board and
the inaccessible reward is smaller than in the on–off condi-
tion. If the subjects learned to choose the side where the
reward was presented on a higher level, we would predict
that the performance remains equally high in the contact
condition as in the on–off condition since in both of these,
the accessible reward is presented on a higher level than the
inaccessible reward. Performance in the perceptual con-
tainment and the gap conditions, however, is predicted to
drop to chance level in that case, since in these conditions,
both rewards are presented on the same vertical level. In
contrast, if the subjects acquired an understanding of the
underlying causal structure of the task, we would predict that
performance does not drop significantly in any of the three
transfer conditions when compared to the on–off condition.
Methods
Subjects
We tested 37 Border Collies at the age of between 18 and
27 months (16 males, 21 females). Twenty-four of these
subjects had been tested with a different physical cognition
task, the string-pulling problem, before (Riemer et al.
2013). All subjects lived as pet dogs with their owners,
who volunteered to bring their dogs to the Clever Dog Lab
for this study. We tested dogs of a single breed with the
aim of reducing variability induced by breed differences
and chose Border Collies due to their high availability and
motivation to work with humans. Also, this breed is neither
highly brachycephalic nor highly dolichocephalic (char-
acteristics that may provide advantages or disadvantages in
visual tasks; McGreevy et al. 2004; Ga´csi et al. 2009), and
we have no reason to assume that Border Collies were
selected for performance in means-end tasks.
Apparatus and conditions
Testing took place in a 5 by 6 m room at the Clever Dog
Lab in Vienna, Austria. The test apparatus consisted of two
Table 1 Perceptual cues that could be used to solve the on–off
condition and corresponding predictions for performance in the three
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yellow wooden boards (11 by 60 by 2 cm) mounted on a 90
by 90 cm black platform (distance between boards:
40 cm). They could be moved backward and forward on
rails embedded in the platform. Three wooden strips were
fixed to the proximal end of both boards to ensure that the
dog could find purchase when trying to pull them out. The
apparatus was placed inside a 1 by 2 m fenced area with
opaque sides and a wire mesh front, from where it was
operated by experimenter 1 (E1). E1 could push out the
apparatus through a 5 cm gap at the bottom of the front
fence at the beginning of each trial, and pull it back in at
the end of the trial (Fig. 1, see also supplementary videos).
An opaque partition mounted 50 cm behind the front fence
prevented visual contact between the dog and E1 and
prevented the dog from observing the baiting process. This
modification compared with the setup of Range et al.
(2011) was introduced to address the possibility that the
dogs may have preferentially chosen the positive option,
the board with the obtainable reward, because it presented
the same layout as the one seen (and rewarded) during pre-
trials in the 2011 study, and to exclude any possible
unconscious cueing by E1. A camera was set up next to the
fenced area so that E1 could see, on the camera screen,
when the dog was ready and a trial could start (Fig. 1).
Four different conditions were presented to the dogs,
with 4 cm strips of sausage used as rewards (Fig. 2). In all
conditions, the two rewards were placed at equal distance
from the subject. For the on–off condition, a reward was
placed on one of the boards, and another reward was placed
5 cm beside the other board (randomly on the left or on the
right side of it). This condition replicated condition 1 of the
Range et al. (2011) study. For the contact condition, a
reward was placed next to and touching one of the boards,
whereas the second reward was placed on the top edge of
the other board (Fig. 2). Again, the two rewards were
placed randomly, either both on the right or both on the
left side of the corresponding board. For the perceptual
containment condition, we used two boards with 7 cm
wide and 10 cm long cut out areas in different positions
(Fig. 2). We introduced a cut out in both boards to ensure
that both options looked different from the layout of the
rewarded option in the on–off condition. Likewise, for the
gap condition, a 12 cm gap in the board was introduced
either in front of or behind the position of the reward
(Fig. 2).
Procedure
Before testing started, the dogs were trained to pull out the
boards using a shaping procedure. For this purpose, the
front fence was removed, so that the dogs could walk up to
the opaque partition behind it. A single baited board was
pushed out (pseudorandomly on the left or on the right
side) until the front part of the board (ca 12 cm) became
accessible to the dog (cf. supplementary video). A reward
was initially placed on the board just behind the partition,
so that the dog could smell, but not see it. When the dog
successfully obtained the reward by pulling out the board
with its paws, the distance between the reward and the
partition was increased stepwise in subsequent shaping
trials. Once a dog retrieved the reward placed at the fur-
thest distance four times in a row (twice on each side), it
proceeded to testing. Note that due to the opaque partition,
the dogs never saw the layout that would be positive during
subsequent testing in this phase, unlike in the training
phase of the 2011 study (Range et al. 2011).
For each test trial, experimenter 2 (E2) brought the dog
to a position 1.5 m in front of the wire mesh fence (cf.
Fig. 1) and put on a blindfold. E1 then started the trial by
pushing out the test apparatus so that its front became
accessible to the dog. When E1 saw on the screen of the
camera that the dog had looked at the apparatus for 5 s, E1
knocked on the ground between the two boards, signaling
to E2 to release the dog. E2 released the dog upon the
signal, additionally giving a verbal ‘‘go’’ command for
dogs that did not leave of their own accord. Once the dog
had left the start position, E2 removed the blindfold and
retrieved the dog when it had obtained the reward after
pulling out the correct board or when it had pulled out the
incorrect board at least half way (see also supplementary
videos). The owner remained outside the testing room
throughout the test trials.
The dogs received 2–4 (median 3) test sessions of 10
trials per day, with a break of at least 5 min between ses-
sions, during which dog and experimenters left the testing
room. Test days were separated by a median of 7 days
Fig. 1 Layout of the experimental setup. Circles indicate positions of
E1 and E2, respectively
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(range 1–37, depending on availability of the dogs). The
correct side was varied pseudorandomly so that the same
side was correct never more than twice in a row. All dogs
were first tested with the on–off condition for a maximum
of 6 sessions (the acquisition phase). Dogs that passed the
learning criterion of at least 16 correct choices in two
consecutive sessions (20 trials) or at least 22 correct
choices in three consecutive sessions (30 trials; binomial
probability \0.02) were subsequently tested with 48
intermixed trials of the four conditions (12 trials per con-
dition in randomized order).
Analyses
For each trial, two variables were coded: (1) which board
the dog touched first and (2) which board the dog pulled
out first by at least 20 cm (half way to obtain the reward).
A correct choice was coded only if the dog touched the
correct board first and pulled it out first. Note that, for the
first touch, it was possible but not required that the board
moves by a few centimeters. Coding was done from video
recordings, with the exception of 23 trials (of the total
2,464) where due to equipment failure we used data from
notes taken by E1 during the experiment. Concordance
between notes and video coding was high [99.5 % for first
touch, 100 % for first pull based on 20 randomly chosen
sessions (200 trials)]. Reliability coding from video
recordings was done by a coder who was unfamiliar with
the goals of the study for 20 randomly chosen sessions and
reliability was excellent (99.5 % for first touch, 100 % for
first pull).
All analyses were performed in R 2.15.1 (R Core Team
2012). The choice data were analyzed with binomial gen-
eralized linear models (GLMs) with logit link, with the
number of correct choices in the numerator and the number
of trials in the denominator of the response variable. GLMs
were run with correction for over-dispersion if applicable.
We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) with
dog identity included as a random effect to test for dif-
ferences between conditions or sessions and for learning
across trials (using R package lme4, Bates et al. 2012). To
determine whether the correct choice probability differed
from chance level for particular sessions or conditions, we
tested whether the intercept differed from 0 (=log(1), cor-
responding to the chance level of 50 %) in binomial GLMs
with the intercept as the only predictor. Subject sex was
initially included in all models as a predictor, but dropped
in all cases as non-significant. The 24 subjects with string-
pulling experience did not perform better in the initial
session of the on–off condition (binomial glm: z = 0.07,
Fig. 2 Illustration of the
experimental apparatus in the
four conditions used in the
experiments when seen from
above: on–off (a), contact (b),
perceptual containment (c) and
gap (d). The dashed line
indicates the location of the wire
mesh fence separating the dog’s
area (bottom) from the
compartment of E1. Note that
for the perceptual containment
condition and the gap condition,
the inaccessible reward was
presented on the same level
above ground as the accessible
reward, whereas the same was
not the case for the on–off and
the contact condition
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p = 0.94) and were not more likely to pass the on–off
condition (Fisher’s exact test: p = 1) than subjects without
string-pulling experience. Also, the performance in the
intermixed trials was not affected by string-pulling expe-
rience (GLMM, z = -0.27, p = 0.78). The data of the two
groups were therefore pooled for all analyses.
Ethical note
The experiments and procedures presented in this manu-
script adhered to the ‘‘guidelines for the treatment of ani-
mals in behavioral research and teaching’’ as published by
the ASAB (2006) and are in accordance with the Austrian
Federal Act on the Protection of Animals (Animal Pro-
tection Act—TSchG, BGBl. I Nr. 118/2004). Furthermore,
as the present study was strictly non-invasive, no special
permission was required in accordance with the Austrian
Animal Experiments Act (§ 2, Federal Law Gazette No.
501/1989).
Results
Acquisition phase: on–off condition
Group performance in the initial 10 trials did not differ
from chance (Table 2; GLM: z = -0.01, p = 0.96), but
performance improved significantly across sessions
(GLMM: z = 4.78, p \ 0.001) and was significantly above
chance level in the 10 trials of the third session (GLM:
z = 2.39, p = 0.017; Table 2; Fig. 3a). Improvement
between adjacent sessions that took place on different test
days was not affected by the interval between the two test
days (session-by-interval interaction, GLMM: z = 0.14,
p = 0.89). Also, whether the off reward was placed on the
inside of the second board (i.e., between the two boards as
shown in Fig. 2) or on the outside did not affect the
probability of a correct choice (GLMM: z = 1.03,
p = 0.30). No dog reached the individual-learning criterion
at the earliest opportunity (after 2 sessions), but 13 of the
37 subjects reached the individual-learning criterion after
3–6 sessions (median: 5 sessions).
Switching to the other board after one board had been
touched (without pulling it out at least half way) occurred
in 4.5 % of all trials. Switching was significantly more
likely to happen after a first touch to the incorrect board
than after a first touch to the correct board (7.9 and 2.0 %
of all trials, respectively, GLMM: z = -5.38, p \ 0.001),
indicating that at least some dogs occasionally used visual
feedback for their decision about which board to pull out.
Sixteen of the 37 dogs switched between boards in more
than one trial. Overall, these ‘‘switchers’’ made fewer
correct choices than the other individuals (GLMM: z =
-2.40, p = 0.017), which might appear surprising given
that they showed more flexibility than the other dogs.
However, this result is probably merely a side effect of our
Table 2 Proportion of correct trials across sessions of the acquisition
phase
Session Mean Standard error Na
1 0.498 0.026 37
2 0.531 0.025 37
3 0.562 0.025 37
4 0.603 0.028 36
5 0.633 0.029 33
6b 0.767 0.033 3
a The sample size decreases across sessions as subjects that reached
the learning criterion moved on to the transfer tests (intermixed trials)
b Only dogs that still had a chance of reaching the learning criterion

























(13) (13) (13) (13)(37) (37) (37)
Session
a b
Fig. 3 Percent correct choices for the first three sessions of the on–off
condition (a) and for the four conditions during intermixed trials (b).
OO on–off condition, CO contact condition, PC perceptual contain-
ment condition, GA gap condition. Numbers in parentheses give
sample sizes. The dashed lines indicate chance level. Data are
displayed as mean and standard error. Stars indicate significant
deviation from chance level: *p \ 0.05; **p \ 0.001
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definition of a correct choice, which required that the
subject does not switch boards within a trial for a correct
choice to be coded. Correspondingly, when trials in which
switching occurred were excluded from this analysis, the
effect disappeared (GLMM: z = -0.85, p = 0.39).
Four conditions intermixed
For the 13 subjects tested with the four conditions inter-
mixed, performance differed significantly between condi-
tions (GLMM with likelihood ratio test, v(3)
2 = 45.7,
p \ 0.001; Fig. 3b). In on–off trials, group performance
was significantly above chance (74.5 % correct, GLM:
t(12) = 4.88, p \ 0.001) and not significantly lower than
the performance of the same thirteen subjects in their last
session of the acquisition phase (80.8 % correct, GLMM:
z = 1.26, p = 0.21). Six subjects performed significantly
above chance at the individual level (C10 of 12 trials
correct, binomial test: p \ 0.04). That only half of the
subjects reached the individual-level criterion again is
probably explained by two factors: First, the criterion was
more difficult to reach since fewer trials were performed
and second, the presentation of different conditions in
intermixed order likely led to increased error rates as
subjects were trying to determine alternative cues that help
them to solve the new conditions.
For contact trials, group performance was also above
chance (72.3 % correct, GLM: t(12) = 4.87, p \ 0.001),
and not significantly different from the performance in on–
off trials (GLMM: z = -0.45, p = 0.65). However, only
three subjects performed significantly above chance at the
individual level; one of them was among the six subjects
that performed significantly above chance in the on–off
trials. In perceptual containment trials, group performance
was not significantly above chance level (60.9 % correct,
GLM: t(12) = 1.78, p = 0.10) and significantly lower than
for contact trials (GLMM: z = -2.15, p = 0.03). Three
subjects performed significantly above chance at the indi-
vidual level in containment trials; these were not the same
subjects that reached the criterion for the contact condition.
In gap trials, group performance was significantly below
chance level (41.7 % correct, GLM: t(12) = -2.32,
p = 0.04); no subject performed significantly different
from chance at the individual level in this condition.
There was some evidence for learning across trials,
reflected in a significant condition-by-trial interaction
(GLMM with likelihood ratio test: v(3)
2 = 11.2, p = 0.01).
For the on–off condition, performance decreased across
trials in the intermixed phase (z = -2.14, p = 0.03). In
contrast, performance improved significantly across trials
for the perceptual containment condition (GLMM:
z = 2.69, p = 0.007) but not for the contact condition
(z = 1.08, p = 0.28) or for the gap condition (z = 0.84,
p = 0.40). The improvement across the twelve trials of the
perceptual containment condition was steeper than the
improvement the same thirteen individuals had shown
across their first twelve trials of the on–off condition in the
acquisition phase, though this effect did not reach signifi-
cance (condition-by-trial interaction: z = 1.74, p = 0.08).
Discussion
A third of the tested dogs learned to solve the on–off
condition of the support problem within a maximum of 60
trials. These dogs subsequently also solved the transfer
condition where the off reward was also touching the
support (contact condition) and showed evidence for quick
learning within 12 trials of the perceptual containment
condition. In contrast, the dogs consistently failed in the
gap condition, where rewards were presented on discon-
tinuous supports.
Performance in the first session of the on–off condition
was not different from chance level, unlike in the earlier
study of Range et al. (2011) where the dogs performed
above chance level in the same condition with only 12
trials per subject. This discrepancy cannot be explained by
the use of different subjects, since performance in the
Range et al. (2011) study was still significantly above
chance when their sample was restricted to Border Collies
(N = 10) or to dogs between 1 and 2 years of age (N = 8).
The discrepancy also cannot be explained by a different
criterion for correct choices, since the dogs in the present
study also did not perform above chance level in their first
session when the criterion of the Range et al. (2011) study
was used (first touch to the correct board without need to
pull it out on their own). Finally, one might suspect that the
dogs in the Range et al. (2011) study, which were tested
with a total of 48 trials of four variations of the on–off
condition in intermixed order, may have reached criterion
because they showed learning across conditions and thus
performed well particularly in the second half of the trials.
However, this suggestion is not supported since the dogs in
the Range et al. (2011) study performed significantly above
chance level already in the first six trials and showed no
evidence of learning across trials of the condition corre-
sponding to the on–off condition in the present study
(Range et al. 2011).
We suggest that the methodological change introduced
in this study, the opaque partition between dog and
experimenter, is responsible for the diverging results of the
present and the previous study (Range et al. 2011). In
particular, the dogs in the 2011 study may have chosen the
correct board in the on–off condition because it presented
the same layout they had already seen (and which was
already rewarded) during their training phase, during which
Anim Cogn (2014) 17:1071–1080 1077
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only one (the positive, rewarded) option was presented and
the subjects learned to perform the action necessary to pull
out the board (in a mean of 22 training trials; Range et al.
2011). In contrast, in the present study, visual access to the
layout during the training phase was precluded by an
opaque partition. That is, the dogs in the 2011 study may
have already started to associate the positive layout with
being rewarded in the training session, whereas the dogs in
the present study could start learning to recognize the
positive layout only once the test trials of the on–off con-
dition were presented. This line of argument is similar to
the one made by Povinelli et al. (2000), who found some
indication that the performance of chimpanzees in support
tasks was improved if one of the options presented matched
the layout known from earlier conditions.
The learning performance of dogs in the on–off condi-
tion lies within the range of performances found for other
species. While the two Asian elephants tested by Irie-Su-
gimoto et al. (2008) needed between 120 and 240 trials to
reach a criterion comparable to the one used by us, in
chimpanzees (Povinelli et al. 2000) and kea (Auersperg
et al. 2009), the majority of subjects solved the on–off
condition much more quickly (within 8–10 trials). Note
though that the training procedure used by Auersperg et al.
(2009), similarly to Range et al. (2011), presented the later
positive ‘‘on’’ layout already during the training trials and,
as suggested by our results, this may have contributed to
the excellent performance of the kea in the first trials of the
on–off condition.
Like chimpanzees (Povinelli et al. 2000) and marmosets
(Yamazaki et al. 2011), the dogs in our study showed little
difficulty with the contact condition. Indeed, the dogs
performed at a similar level of accuracy in the contact
condition as in the on–off condition, which stands in con-
trast to the primate data. The chimpanzees tested by
Povinelli et al. (2000) performed worse in the contact
condition, though the effect for the eight subjects did not
reach significance (see also Yocom and Boysen 2011). The
four marmosets tested by Yamazaki et al. (2011) performed
significantly worse in the contact condition (the ‘‘standard
condition’’ in their terminology) than in the on–off condi-
tion (the ‘‘longer distance condition’’ in their terminology)
as revealed by our re-analysis of the data presented in their
Fig. 2 (pooling the six variations of each condition; bino-
mial GLMM with subject identity as a random factor and
condition as a predictor: z = 4.11, p \ 0.001).
In the perceptual containment condition, the perfor-
mance of the dogs dropped to chance level at first, but
quickly and significantly improved thereafter. The initial
problems of the dogs with transferring from the on–off to
the perceptual containment condition match the findings of
Povinelli et al. (2000) for chimpanzees, which performed
poorly in the perceptual containment conditions, a finding
that led them to suggest that the apes may rely on current or
imminent contact between reward and support when
attempting to solve the support problem (but see Yocom
and Boysen 2011). In contrast, the keas tested by Auer-
sperg et al. (2009) performed above chance level in the
perceptual containment conditions from their first session
on, which, as they suggested, may be explained by the
superior visual acuity of birds compared with mammals.
The gap condition has consistently proven to be among
the most challenging of the support problem conditions
presented to animals so far. In addition to the dogs in our
study, pigeons (Schmidt and Cook 2006), tamarins (Hauser
et al. 1999), marmosets (Yamazaki et al. 2011) and an
Asian elephant (Irie-Sugimoto et al. 2008) have either
failed in this task or required a considerable number of
trials to learn to solve it, while kea appeared to learn more
quickly and one individual reached criterion within ten
trials (Auersperg et al. 2009). Only for great apes, there is
some evidence that they can perform above chance level
spontaneously in this condition, though at a low level of
accuracy of less than 60 % correct choices (Herrmann et al.
2008). Unlike other species tested so far, however, the dogs
in our study performed significantly below chance level in
the gap condition, thus showing a preference for the
shorter, non-rewarded board. This finding matches the one
of a recent string-pulling study, in which dogs also devel-
oped a preference for the shorter, non-rewarded string over
a longer rewarded string (Range et al. 2012). While these
unexpected results remain unexplained, the replication
within species and the contrast to other species suggest that
they may reflect a species-specific predisposition, for
example a preference for a smaller over a larger non-food
object that needs to be handled or moved.
The variable performance of the dogs across conditions
suggests that they used a perceptual cue (or a combination
of cues) in their attempts to solve the support problem. The
combination of an excellent performance in the contact
trials, which was statistically not different from the per-
formance in the on–off trials, and the poor performance in
the perceptual containment and gap trials is most consis-
tent with the suggestion that many of the dogs had learned
to choose the reward that was on the board rather than the
one that was off the other board and thus on a lower level.
(cf. Table 1). The dogs did not appear to use the color or
brightness of the background on which the reward was
resting (bright yellow for the reward on, black for the
reward off the support) to guide their choices. In that case,
transfer to the perceptual containment condition should
have been instantaneous. The dogs’ good performance in
the contact condition also indicates that they had not
learned to base their choices on the visual contact between
reward and board or based on the alignment of board and
reward. Finally, also a reliance on perceptual containment
1078 Anim Cogn (2014) 17:1071–1080
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does not appear to be consistent with our results as, in this
case, we would have predicted a reduced performance in
the contact condition (where containment was similar
between the two options) compared with the on–off con-
dition (where the accessible reward was surrounded on all
four sides by the support, and the inaccessible reward was
not contained at all).
Our finding that the dogs showed quick learning in the
perceptual containment condition, with a parallel decrease
in performance in the on–off condition, also indicates that
perceptual cues may be quickly abandoned once they
became unreliable. In contrast the poor, below chance
performance in the gap condition indicates that some
inherent biases are hard to overcome in such perceptual
learning tasks (see also Head et al. 1998; Kelber 2002;
Miller and Pawlik 2013). Finally, the exceptional perfor-
mance of three subjects in the perceptual containment
condition, in contrast to the group-level performance for
this condition which was initially at chance level, suggests
that these individuals may have relied on a different per-
ceptual cue, such as the yellow versus black background in
which the rewards were presented, to solve the support
problem.
Rather than making their choice based on a perceptual
cue of the presented layout, the subjects could have made
their decision which board to pull out based on visual
feedback, as previously found in string-pulling tasks for
corvids (Taylor et al. 2012) as well as for some dogs (Riemer
et al. 2013). That is, the subjects could have used the strategy
to pull out one support a bit and then decide whether to
continue or switch to the other option based on whether the
reward moved or not. However, this strategy was used only
rarely by the dogs in the present study (note that, following
our criterion, these trials were coded as incorrect choices,
even though the dogs obtained the reward).
To conclude, our study shows that at least some dogs can
learn to solve the classic Piagetian support problem, but
appear to do so by associating perceptual cues that are not
causally related to the physical underpinnings of the task
with the obtaining of a reward. The subjects that had solved
this problem subsequently showed significant transfer to the
condition where the perceptual cue was still reliable and
some evidence of quick adoption of new cues when the
originally learned cue was no longer reliable. Our results
thus add to a growing body of evidence that animals typi-
cally rely on, or learn to attend to, perceptual cues that may
be correlated with the causally relevant information, but are
not representing the underlying causal structure, when
facing a problem-solving task (cf. Povinelli 2000; Penn and
Povinelli 2007; Yamazaki et al. 2011; Albiach-Serrano
et al. 2012; Gajdon et al. 2013). In addition, our data suggest
that associative learning of perceptual cues may start
already during training or habituation phases and that initial
performance in previous studies may thus have been over-
estimated. Based on this finding, it is recommended that the
positive (or negative) layout used during testing should not
be presented in pre-trials of physical cognition tasks, during
which subjects commonly get habituated to the apparatus
and learn to perform the necessary actions. The consider-
able variation in performance we found between individuals
furthermore calls for an in-depth analysis of the factors
affecting individual performance in cognitive tasks (see
also, e.g., Herrmann and Call 2012).
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